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INTRODUCTION

The protagonists battle on. Trumpeting right answers,2
foundations, and truth,4 objectivists lash out against the
unrelenting tide of nihilism, postmodernism, and deconstruction.5
Armed with the tools of literary theory, antifoundationalism, and
Kuhnian6 "relativism," subjectivists 7 dismiss the dreams of
objectivism as philosophical illusions. But the "conflict" between
these two camps is vastly overstated. In fact, the entire debate
depends upon a shared premise, one that is both false and
unnecessary. The objectivism/subjectivism debate assumes a
picture of mind and law that should be extirpated rather than
explicated.8 In this Article, I argue in favor of objectivity but do so
2. RONALD DWoRmN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter DwoRKIN,
SERIOUSLY] (arguing that even in so-called "hard cases" there is a right answer to every legal
question).
3. For a discussion of the work of Michael Moore, see infra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
4. Dworkin must be given credit here, for he was the first to notice the connection
between questions of "truth" in the philosophy of language and issues in jurisprudence.
Ronald Dworkin, Introduction, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 1977)
("Even the debate about the nature of law, which has dominated legal philosophy for some
decades, is, at bottom, a debate within the philosophy of language and metaphysics.").
5. Although certainly not an objectivist, Ronald Dworkin does give voice to the
impatience felt by some in the objectivist camp. Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth.
You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 87, 87 (1996):
Is there any objective truth? Or must we finally accept that at bottom, in the
end, philosophically speaking, there is no "real" or "objective' or "absolute" or
"foundational" or "fact of the matter" or "right answer" truth about anything,
that even our most confident convictions about what happened in the past or
what the universe is made of or who we are or what is beautiful or who is
wicked are just our convictions, just conventions, just ideology, just badges of
power, just the rules of the language games we choose to play, just the product
of our irrepressible disposition to deceive ourselves that we have discovered out
there some external, objective, timeless, mind-independent world what we have
actually invented ourselves, out of instinct, imagination and culture?
6. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTUREOFSCIENTIFICREVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970)(arguing
that scientific knowledge is a function of a "paradigm" of scientific inquiry).
7. For more on the particulars of subjectivism, see infranotes 33-52 and accompanying
text.
8. Objectivism and subjectivism (relativism) need each other: without its opposite,
neither position would get off the ground. See BRIAN FAY, CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE 220 (1996):
[Olbjectivism and relativism are not true opposites; indeed, they exist on the
same spectrum albeit at opposite ends. Both assume that objectivity requires
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from a more perspicuous framework. I seek to change the terms of
the debate from one of mind to one of action. After this change is
effected, the current debate will simply fade away, and a new, more
revealing focus shall take its place.
Objectivity is often theorized as a relationship between an
assertion and some state of affairs in virtue of which the assertion
is "objectively true."9 The nub of the argument is that assertions or
beliefs are true in virtue of the way things are (i.e., facts)." Facts
make assertions and beliefs true, and objectively so, for facts are
not mere matters of mind: they are a function of the way things
are." By conceptualizing objectivity in terms of a connection
unmediated access to the world, the only difference between them being that
objectivists believe this access attainable at least in theory, while relativists
deny this access attainable even in theory. Objectivism and relativism are
simply opposite sides of the very same coin.
9. This is "the venerable notion that truth is the property of correspondingwith reality."
PAULHORWICH, TRUTH8 (2d ed. 1998). For a succinct discussion ofthe correspondence theory
of truth in a wider context of theories, see Paul Horwich, Theories of Truth, in BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO METAPHYSICS 491-96 (Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa eds., 1995).
10. Objectivity and truth are often seen as metaphysically related, Andrei Marmor, Three
Concepts of Objectivity, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 177, 181 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995)
("Objectivity in the metaphysical sense ... implies that there is a truth of the matter
consisting in the fact that there is an object with properties corresponding to its description
by the statement in question."); NICOS STAVROPOULOS, OBJECTIVITY IN LAw (1996)
(discussing the links between law and metaphysics).
11. John Searle is one staunch defender of a strong conception of objectivity. JOHN R.
SEARLE, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REATY (1995). He argues:
[Two senses are crucial, an epistemic sense of the objective-subjective
distinction and an ontological sense. Epistemically speaking, "objective" and
"subjective" are primarily predicates ofjudgments. We often speakofjudgments
as being "subjective" when we mean that their truth or falsity cannot be settled
"objectively," because the truth or falsity is not a simple matter of fact but
depends on certain attitudes, feelings, and points of view of the makers and the
hearers of the judgment. An example of such ajudgment might be, "Rembrandt
is a better artist than Rubens." In this sense of "subjective," we contrast such
subjective judgments with objective judgments, such as the judgment
"Rembrandt lived in Amsterdam during the year 1632." For such objective
judgments, the facts in the world that make them true or false are independent
of anybody's attitudes or feelings about them. In this epistemic sense we can
speak not only of objective judgments but of objective facts. Corresponding to
objectively true judgments there are objective facts. It should be obvious from
these examples that the contrast between epistemic objectivity and epistemic
subjectivity is a matter of degree.
In addition to the epistemicsense of the objective-subjective distinction, there
is also a related ontological sense. In the ontological sense, "objective" and
"subjective" are predicates of entities and types of entities, and they ascribe
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between a belief or assertion and a mind-independent state of
affairs, proponents of objectivity all but guarantee creation of
objectivism's opposite, subjectivism. Subjectivists deny the efficacy
of the objectivist account of the relation between mind and world,
locating the seat of truth and belief in the individual subject. The
debate is intractable.
I argue that the choice between objectivism and subjectivism is
false. Just because we are free to describe a situation in a variety
ofways (rejecting objectivism)"2 does not dictate the conclusion that,
within each vocabulary, there are no standards for correct and
incorrect assertion (rejecting subjectivism). 3 I propose to approach
objectivity from the point of view of normativity. By "normativity"
I mean to identify the ways in which speakers of a language
appraise assertoric utterances in terms of "correct" and "incorrect"
or "true" and "false." I want to replace the conventional
understanding of objectivity with an account of the notion that
grows out of the actual practice of law. My claim is that the
normativity and objectivity of legal judgment is a function not ofthe
way the world is, but is forged in community agreement over time.
Action, not mind, is the basis of this alternative approach to
normativity and objectivity.
Law exhibits an argumentative framework employed by
participants in legal practice to show the truth of legal
propositions.14 Identifying this framework, and describing how it is
modes of existence. In the ontological sense, pains are subjective entities,
because their mode of existence depends on being felt by subjects. But
mountains, for example, in contrast to pains, are ontologicallyobjective because
their mode of existence is independent of any perceiver or any mental state.
Id. at 8.
12. I argue against the idea that any given discourse or vocabulary is "primary." This
second-order or "meta" perspective is the philosophical pretension I wish to deny. For an
excellent recent discussion of this issue in the context of ongoing struggles between
practitioners of analytic and continental philosophy, see Richard Rorty, Being That Can Be
Understoodis Language, LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 16,2000, at 23-25 (book review)
(arguing against the view that any language or discourse-e.g., the language of
science-enjoys ontological privilege).
13. In other words, "propositions, true or false, are indexed to some conceptual scheme
or schemes." MICHAEL P. LYNCH, TRUTH IN CONTEXT. AN ESSAY ON PLURALISM AND
OBJECTIVrrY 21 (1998).
14. Fordiscussion ofpropositions oflaw and claims to truth, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 4 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE] ("Let us call 'propositions of law' all the
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used to appraise propositions of law, is a central feature of my
argument. Objectivity is a product of the recursive use of this
argumentative framework. I shall describe the framework in detail,
explain how action, not mind, is the central feature of normativity,
and then explain both the presence and limits of objectivity in law.
This Article has five parts. I begin by describing the current state
of the objectivity debate in legal theory.'5 The two leading positions,
objectivism and subjectivism, are discussed in the context of
exemplary examples of each position. The conclusion of this part of
the Article is that the debate between objectivism and subjectivism
rests on a false premise. Having identified that premise, I explain
in Part II why normativity can best be thought of in social rather
than cognitive terms. Here I discuss the oft-trodden topic of rulefollowing 6 to set the stage for Part I, where I argue for the social
basis of normativity. In Part IV, we reach the practice of law. Here
I detail why a social approach to normativity provides a more
perspicuous account of the nature of objectivity in legal practice.
Finally, in Part V, I consider possible objections to my account of
normativity and objectivity. Specifically, I explain why law seems
less objective than practices such as science and arithmetic.' 7

various statements and claims people make aboutwhatthe law allows or prohibits or entitles
them to have.").
15. The discussion of the current state of the debate is broader than that found in
analytic jurisprudence, although Ibelieve analytic jurisprudence is the place where one finds
the most well-developed positions. That said, analytic philosophy does not comprise the
entire field of legal theory. The discussion of objectivity, as well as related topics such as
interpretation, indeterminacy, and linguistic meaning, is much wider than what is captured
in the discourse of analytic philosophers. I think it important to consider this wider
perspective in any discussion of objectivity. Arecent and quite successful example of such an
approach is GuYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW (2000)

(presenting a sophisticated and wide-ranging discussion of literary and philosophical
approaches to the reading of texts).
16. The discussion in Part H centers around two logically distinct forms ofexplanation:
causal and normative. My argument is that normative explanation is logically distinct from,
and not reducible to, the language of causal explanation. For a discussion of the variety of
forms of explanation, see DANIEL LiTTLE, VARITIEms OF SOCiAL EXPLANATION (1991).
17. For an argument that law is less objective than naturalistic inquires such as the
natural sciences, see Brian Leiter, Objectivity and the Problems ofJurisprudence,72 TEx.
L. REv. 187 (1993) (reviewing KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVriy (1992)). See also
Jules L. Coleman & BrianLeiter, Determinacy, Objectivity andAuthrity,142 U. PA. L. REV.
549 (1993) (arguing for an account of law as "modestly objective").
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I. OBJECTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVISM

Current discussions ofobjectivity inthejurisprudential literature
come down to the question of grounds for legal judgments.' There
are two views, in both the philosophical and jurisprudential
literature, that dominate the discussion. These views-which I will
label "objectivism" and "subjectivism'--name two radically distinct
approaches to the question of what it means to follow a normative
standard such as a legal rule. 9 Before we can consider a fresh
approach to the question of normativity and the possibility of
objectivity in law, thorough familiarity with the leading views in
the objectivity debate is both necessary and appropriate.
A. Objectivism
When we look at various applications of a rule, it is quite natural
to ask "In what sense are these different applications each an
application of the same rule?" This question is an aspect of a
broader philosophical inquiry, namely how are we able to look at a
variety of different objects and say "These are the same." Consider
fruit. If the rule in question is "Only fruit will be served for snacks,"
then we know the following items may be served: oranges, bananas,
peaches, and grapes. This all seems quite straightforward. What is
the philosophical issue?" The philosopher asks "In virtue of what
18. These include questions about what the law permits or requires; whether a given
legal standard has been violated; or whether a judge's decision is correct as a matter of law.
19. Everything said herein about rules applies equally well to principles and policies. In
some jurisprudential theories, distinctions among types of legal norms makes a difference.
E.g., DWORKIN, SERIOUSLY, supranote 2, at 22 (arguing that rules and principles are logically
distinct). Nothing I say turns on such distinctions.
20. The philosophical debate has traditionally been framed in terms of Realism and
Nominalism. For example, Renford Bambrough explains that:
It is assumed as obvious by both the nominalist and the realist that there can
be no objective justification for the application of a general term to its instances
unless its instances have something in common over and above their having in
common that they are its instances. The nominalist rightly holds that there is
no such additional common element, and he therefore wrongly concludes that
there is no objective justification for the application of any general term. The
realist rightly holds that there is an objective justification for the application
ofgeneral terms, and he therefore wrongly concludes that there must be some
additional common element.
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are all these items 'fruits'?" Or, put differently, the philosopher
might ask "What is it about all these items that makes them
properly called 'fruits'?"
The first answer we shall consider comes from the objectivist. It
is not enough for the objectivist that all these things are called
fruits. The objectivist believes that they are all called fruits because
they are, in some sense, really fruits.2" What, one might ask, is the
difference between something merely being called a fruit and it, in
fact, being a fruit? To this question the objectivist has a distinct and
well-wrought answer.
When we set out to follow a rule, we never believe that whether
we have complied with the rule is a matter of opinion. We may
believe that we have complied with the dictates of a rule, but that
belief cannot be grounds for our claim that we have in fact
complied. This shows that rules exhibit what we might term
"epistemic primacy." By this, I mean that the broad application of
rules "seems to imply a standard of correctness that is independent
of applications."2 2 To explain this phenomenon, the objectivist
asserts the existence of a standard independent of the rule which
enables rule application in a variety of contexts. Let us consider a
jurisprudential example.
More than anyone, Michael Moore has championed the objectivist
position" in modem analytic jurisprudence. 2 ' Moore explicitly
Renford Bambrough, Universals and Family Resemblances, in WITTGENSTEIN: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 199 (George Pitcher ed., 1968).

21. Ronald Dworkin makes frequent use of the word "really" in sentences such as the
following- "[Riggs v. Palmer] was a dispute about what the law was, about what the real
statute the legislators enacted really said." DwORCIN, EMPIRE, supra note 14, at 20. In
putting the matter as he does, Dworkin hints that there may be a difference between what
we may think the law requires and what the law "really"requires. Does Dworkin thereby
intend to suggest a realist jurisprudence? The point is that such phrasing suggests at least
the possibility of a gap between the way things are (i.e., what the law "really"requires) and
the way things seem to be (i.e., what we think the law requires). My point is that such a
distinction is vacuous. Despite his hinting otherwise, Dworkin never attempts to supply the
metaphysical scaffolding to support his hints at realism.
22. MEREDITH WILLIAMS, WrITGENSTEIN, MIND AND MEANING 158 (1998).

23. Moore self-identifies his position as "realism." His view is certainly "realist" in the
sense that he believes "reality" is mind-independent and has a structure which, in principle,
can be grasped by the mind. For a definition of"realism," see MICHAELDUMME'Tr,TRUTHAND
OTHER ENIGMAS 146 (1978) ("Realism I characterise as the belief that statements of the
disputed class possess an objective truth-value, independently of our means of knowing it:
they are true or false in virtue of a reality existing independently of us."). I think Moore is
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rejects the claim that the meaning of our words turns on anything
but a standard of correctness independent of our discourse.
Consider his treatment of the concept of "death." He writes:
A realist theory asserts that the meaning of "death," for
example, is not fixed by certain conventions. Rather, a realist
theory asserts that "death" refers to a natural kind of event that
occurs inthe world and that it is not arbitrary that we possess
some symbol to name this thing. (It may be arbitrary what
symbol we assign to name this class of events, but it is not
arbitrary that we have some symbol to name it). Our intentions
when we use the word "death" will be to refer to this natural
kind of event, whatever its true nature might turn out to be. We
will guide our usage, in other words, not by some set of
conventions we have agreed upon as to when someone will be
said to be dead; rather, we will seek to apply "dead" only to
people who are really dead, which we determine by applying the
best scientific theory we can muster about what death really is.
Finally, a realist theory of meaning will not view a change in
our conventions about when to apply a word as a change in its
meaning. If we supplant "heart stoppage" with "revivability" as
our indicator of "death," we will do so because we believe
revivability to be a part of a bettertheory of what death is than
more an "objectivist"than a "realist." Objectivism presupposes realism, but realism in no way
entails or requires it. Objectivists share with realists the view that the world exists beyond
our ideas and quite apart from anything we may believe about it. But the objectivist believes
not only that the world exists independently of our ideas of it, but that the world has an
order or structure that is, in principle, discernible. That said, not all objectivists adhere to
the same set of philosophical ideals. The following is a description of "pure objectivism":
[0]bjectivism is a complex of ideas. It includes a realist ontology; a positivist
epistemology; a correspondence theory of truth and scientific progress; and an
axiology of disinterest. Within this complex, objectivity is conceived as a
property of the results of inquiry, namely the property of these results being
true. A theory or a fact is said to be objective if it fits with reality as it is in
itself. Secondarily, persons or methods are said to be objective if they eliminate
the subjective elements which typically prevent achieving objective truth.
FAY, supranote 8, at 204.

24. For a positionwith objectivist aspirations, see Brian Leiter, Objectivity, Morality,and
Adjudication, in OBJECTIVrYIN LAWAND MoRALS 66,88 (Brian Leiter ed., 2000) ("Objective
domains must generally answer to the world at some point: only then can we distinguish
between mere hegemonic conventions from practices of argument about genuinely objective
domains.").
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heart stoppage. We will not have changed the meaning of
"death" when we substitute one theory for another, because by
"death" we intended to refer to the naturally occurring kind of
thing, whatever the true nature of the event turned out to be.
Our linguistic intentions are constant, on the realist theory,
even if our scientific theories change considerably.25
InPhilosophicalInvestigations,Wittgenstein characterizes views
like Moore's as advancing a "rules on rails" thesis.' The idea is that
the applications of a rule extend into the future much as a rail
extends the length and direction of a train. The train (rule) is
connected to the rail (the essential property or natural kind term)
and proceeds in a predetermined direction. The rule operates "as if'
it were on a rail in that future applications of the rule (its
extension) are already determined by the independent property
(e.g., the natural kind term).
Wittgenstein reveals a basic problem with this picture (of a mind
grasping an objective standard) of what it means to follow a rule
with the argument that even if there were a standard like that
imagined by the objectivist, the standard would be of no use to us
unless we knew how to use it. 27 And once we entertain the question
25. Michael S. Moore,ANaturalLawTheoryoflnterpretation,58 S. CAL.L.REv. 277,294
(1985).
26. LUDWIG WrrIGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 218 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter WrrIrGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS] ("And infinitely long rails
correspond to the unlimited application of a rule."). John McDowell characterizes the view
this way.
What counts as doing the same thing, within the practice in question, is fixed
by its rules. The rules mark out rails along which correct activity within the
practice must run. These rails are there anyway, independently of the
responses and reactions apropensityto which one acquires when one learns the
practice itself; or, to put the idea less metaphorically, it is in principle
discernible, from a standpoint independent of the responses that characterize
a participant in the practice, that a series of correct moves in the practice is
really a case ofgoing on doing the same thing. Acquiring mastery ofthe practice
is pictured as something like engaging mental wheels with these objectively
existing rails.
JohnMcDowell,Nbn-Cognitivism andRue-Following,in STEVENHOLTZMAN & CHRSTOPHER
LEICH, WriTGENSTEIN: TO FOLLOWARULa 145-46 (1981).
27. See JOHNMCDOWELL, PROJECTIONANDTRUTHINETHICS 11 (1987) (arguing that "we
have some way of telling what can count as a fact, prior to and independent of asking what
forms of words might count as expressing truths, so that a conception of facts could exert
some leverage in the investigation of truth").
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of how to use the "objective standard," the whole point of the
exercise evaporates.28 Put differently, the problem is that anything
that serves as a standard can be variously interpreted.29 And if a
standard is amenable to various interpretations, one interpretation
must be chosen. But the standard does not tell us which
interpretation is the "correct" one. Thus, the very thing (the
objective standard) introduced to solve the problem serves only to
recapitulate the dilemma."0
Thus, objectivism fails. What to do? One possibility is to embrace
objectivism's opposite, that is, subjectivism. There are of course,
many meanings to subjectivism, with possible candidates ranging
from deconstruction"1 to idealism. 2 In addition to questioning the
determinacy of linguistic meaning, subjectivist positions all
embrace the view that linguistic meaning is located in the
individual subject. Let us now turn to an example of this view.
B. Subjectivism
If objectivity is unattainable, then what? A favorite alternativesubjectivism-is well-represented in contemporary legal theory. The
positions are various, to be sure. Yet each seems to make the failure
of objectivism the starting point of analysis. An oft-quoted
expression of this view is found in the work of Joseph Singer:

28. See Jeremy Waldron, The IrrelevanceofMoral Objectivity, in NATURALLAWTHEORY
158 (Robert P. George ed., 1992) (arguing against the usefulness of meta-ethics based on
metaphysical realism).
29. Hilary Putnam argues that the problem may be even deeper than I suggest:
[E]ven when we see such a "reality" as a tree, the possibility of that perception
is dependent on a whole conceptual scheme in place (one which may or may not
legislate an answer to such questions as "Is the tree identical with the spacetime region that contains it?" and "Is the tree identical with the mereological
sum of the time-slices of elementary particles that make it up?").
HILARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND REALrrY 113 (1988).

30. Wittgenstein discusses the use of drawn figures and the language of calculation in
WITGENSTEIN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 1-38. I discuss this further in Dennis
Patterson, Wittgenstein and ConstitutionalTheory, 72 TEx L. REV. 1837, 1848-49 (1994).
31. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMmATOLOGY (Gayatri Spivak trans., 1976)

(criticizing "logocentrism" and "presence" in Western metaphysics).
32. "Idealism" is "the view that mind is the most basic reality and that the physical world
exists only only as an appearance to or expression of mind." CONCISE ROUTLEDGE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 379 (2000).
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We cannot expect the new to emerge phoenix-like from the
old. Traditional legal theorists have assumed that theory is, or
should be determinative-thatthe goal of theory is to generate
answers. For this view to make sense, we must believe that it is
possible to find out what to do by thinking in the right way....
But in the end, all the sophisticated versions of theory that
seek to describe it as a decision procedure based on a sure
foundation are supremely unconvincing; they cannot convince
precisely because they are so sophisticated. The dilemma comes
down to this: For a theory to generate answers, it must be
mechanical, yet no mechanical theory can render an adequate
account of our experience oflegitimate moral choice. We cannot
even escape the dilemma by trying to make some of our choices
(the "core") mechanical and some (the "periphery") open-ended:
No mechanical choices appear to be unequivocally valid."3
Bereft of a mechanical decision-procedure for making choices, we
are left to our own devices. Our only compasses in a world of
indeterminate values, and equally indeterminate meaning, are our
own predilections, what has come to be known as our "politics."-'
There is one figure in the subjectivist camp who affirms the basic
tenets of the position but has a totally different response to the
33. Joseph W. Singer, The Playerand the Cards, 94 YALEL.J. 1, 61 (1984). For a similar
view, see JEROME FRANiK, LAWANDTHE MODEtNMND 129 (1963) ("The law is not a machine
.... "). A superb critique of the skeptical arguments of Critical Legal Studies is found in

Christian Zapf& Eben Moglen, LinguisticIndeterminacyand the Rule of Law: OnThe Perils
offMisunderstandingWittgenstein, 84 GEo. L.J. 485 (1996).
34. At least one early champion of the indeterminacy/politics thesis has recently
tempered his opinion, stating:
The radicalization of indeterminacy is ...
a mistake; not merely a mistake
about law and language but also a mistake about the relation between what the
radical indeterminists mean and what they say. Emerging as the all but
inexorable outcome of a long progression of ideas, the radicalization of the
indeterminacy thesis makes us realize that something has long since gone
wrong in the terms ofthis discussion.
We cannot, just by saying so, turn a political defeat into a word game. We
must sacrifice the metaphor to the campaign, and recognize that law can be
something, and that it matters what it is. Having rejected the radicalization of
indeterminacy as a misstatement of radical intentions, we must then go on to
repudiate the central role of the problem of determinacy and discretion in legal
theory.
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYsIs BECOME? 121-22 (1996).
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"problem." I have in mind Stanley Fish. Although it is certainly true
that Fish's views have gone through a number of iterations,3 5 he has
consistently adhered to a basic hermeneutic 6 theme: all understanding is interpretation. The following is representative:
The point is a simple one: All shapes are interpretively
produced, and since the conditions of interpretation are
themselves unstable-the possibility of seeing something in a
"new light," and therefore of seeing a new something, is ever
and unpredictably present-the shapes that seem perspicuous
to us now may not seem so or may seem differently so
tomorrow. This applies not only to the shape of statutes, poems,
and signs in airplane lavatories, but to the disciplines and forms
of life within which statutes, poems, and signs become available
to us. 7

35. The following summary of the evolution of Fish's thought is instructive:
Stanley Fish ... has long since committed himself to the initial assertions of
reader-response criticism and... continues to do so but, by changing his position
a number oftimes, has struggled with the kinds of unacceptable consequences
of those assertions.... But his latest reformulation [STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A
TExT IN THIS CLASS? (1980)], which is offered as if no more than a refinement,
amounts in fact to his abandoning its essentials completely. His most recent
version, then, involves the postulation of interpretive communities, with
assumptions and conventions that guide interpretation; this, in his view, allows
communication to take place and so rescues him from the consequences of
earlier formulations. Now it is, of course, true that a text means nothing
without conventions shared by the speakers of the language concerned, but to
acknowledge this fiu!y would, as Fish sees, abolish his reader-response position:
if readers are guided by the rules of language, they do not have the freedom
envisaged by reader-response theory, and so the text together with its relation
to the linguistic system can be the place to which disputes are appealed after
all, contrary to the statement by Fish that I cited. In order to continue to cling
to his reader-response position, then, Fish continues to deny that it is sharing
a language and "knowing the meanings of individual words and the rules for
combining them" that is involved in communication but, instead, a "way of
thinking, a form oflife." But this direct denial that the shared rules of language
makes communication possible is surely bizarre, and the distinction he makes
here is certainly untenable. Oddly enough, Fish's language here recalls
Wittgenstein's, but in using it Wittgenstein was pointing out precisely that a
language with its rules, conventions, and agreements is a way of thinking and
form of life!
JOHN ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION 121 n.6 (1989).

36. For discussion of the hermeneutic tradition, see infra note 43.
37. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIEs 302 (1989).
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The meaning of everything is "interpretively produced." The
conditions of interpretation themselves are unstable. Therefore,
linguistic meaning is unstable. Today's "correct" interpretation is
tomorrow's "error." All of this is quite controversial and hotly
contested.3" Having already advanced an in-depth critique of Fish's
views,39 I do not wish to rehash those arguments here. There is,
however, an aspect of Fish's thought that is quite widely shared,'
and that is the idea that the world comes to us through acts of
interpretation."' The idea is most fully developed 2 in the
hermeneutic philosophical tradition," but is a commonplace in
38. For a particularly harsh critique of Fish's views, see Terry Eagleton, The Estate
Agent, LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 2, 2000, at 10-11 (reviewing STANLEY FISH, THE
TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (1999)). An intelligent comparison of Fish and Wittgenstein is
found in Charles Altieri, Going On and Going Nowhere: Wittgenstein and the Question of
Criteriain Literary Criticism, in CHARLES ALTIERI, CANONS AND CONSEQUENCES 81-107
(1990) (arguing that Fish's relativism is born, among other things, of a failure to appreciate
the normative role of grammar in practices).
39. See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 99-127 (1996) [hereinafter PATTERSON,
TRUTH]. For an exchange with Fish over my reading of his work, see Colloquy, 72 TMx L.
REV. 1-77 (1993) (including article by Patterson, reply by Fish, and rebuttal by Patterson).
40. See, e.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 101 (1992) ("It is
interpretation that gives us the rule, not the other way around."); FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BYTHE RULES 207 (1991) ("[Elvery application of a rule is also an interpretation.").
For an excellent critique of Cornell on interpretation, see Martin Stone, Focusing the Law:
What Legal InterpretationIs Not, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 10, at 31-96
(discussing the limits of interpretation in law).
41. Fish'sjurisprudentialnemesis, Ronald Dworkin, shares this view. DWORKIN,EMPRE,
supranote 14 (advancing the thesis that "law" is an interpretive practice and that the truth
of legal propositions is a matter of interpretation).
42. The idea of interpretation as a function of "perspective" comes from Nietzsche:
"Everything is subjective," you say; but even this is interpretation. The
"subject" is not something given, it is something added and invented and
projected beyond what there is.-Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter
behind the interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis.
In so far as the word"knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but
it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless
meanings.-"Perspectivism."
It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against.
Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would
like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.
FRIEDRICH NIEZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 267 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann
& R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1968).
43. See MICHAEL INWOOD, AHEIDEGGERDICTIONARY 106 (1999).
Our everyday life is pervaded by interpretation, both of ourselves and of other
entities. Everyday, 'circumspect' interpretation is prior to the systematic
interpretation undertaken by the humane sciences, and prior to the
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contemporary, sophisticated academic thought." This notion, I
believe, is philosophically flawed.4 5
explanations of the natural sciences. A scientist has to find the way to the
library or laboratory, and interpret its contents as books or other equipment,
before doing any science. According to Heidegger, we interpret all the way
down. We do not first see uninterpreted black marks on a white background or
first hear pure sounds, and then interpret them as printing or as speech. We
perceive them right away as printed or spoken words, even if we cannot
understand them: 'What we "first"hear is never noises or complexes of sounds,
but the creaking wagon, the motor-cycle. [...] It requires a very artificial and
complicated frame of mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'. [...] Even where the speech
is indistinct or the language unknown, we immediately hear unintelligible
words, not a multiplicity of tone-data.' Heidegger was at this stage influenced
less by Nietzsche and far more by Dilthey, -who had in his later writings
travelled a good way along Heidegger's own path. The ubiquity ofinterpretation
does not, for Heidegger, imply Nietzschean scepticism. The fact that I
immediately interpret speech as speech or a tool as a tool does not entail that
my interpretation is unreliable or incorrigible or that it creates the meaning of
what is interpreted. At most it undermines the view that interpretations are
based on, or answerable to, uninterpreted foundations.
Id. (quotations as in original) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). Heidegger
represents the high point in the development of the hermeneutic tradition starting from
Dilthey. Although there are certain surface similarities between the thought of Heidegger
and Wittgenstein, the commentary just reproduced highlights a key difference in approach
to the nature of understanding. Because Heidegger comprehends "understanding" as an
internal and personal operation of mind, he remains within the philosophical tradition that
starts with Descartes in so far as he locates meaning in the individual. For his part,
Wittgenstein's later thought represents a break with the philosophical tradition starting with
Descartes in that he locates meaning not within persons but outside them, that is, in public
practices. One need only consider Dworkin's approach to legal interpretation to realize that
philosophy remains within the grip of the Cartesian picture of mind. See DWORKIN, supra
note 4 (building a theory of law out of a theory of interpretation).
44. See, e.g., the classic collection of interdisciplinary essays in THE PoiTIcS OF
INTERPRETATION (W.J. Thomas Mitchell ed., 1982) (including classic essays by Fish and
Dworkin).
45. The notion of meaning being "up for grabs" or "indeterminate" is a pervasive feature
of contemporary critical theory, in law and elsewhere. Despite its pervasive character in
European thought, this view is coming under increasing scrutiny. The following is a superb
critique:
Is this conception of language viable? Ifwe take away the decorations around
the way it is formulated, it boils down to a decision to homogenize the question
of sense or meaning. It comes down to saying that there is one and only one
passages [sic] from signs to meaning: interpretation. A crucial distinction is
thereby lost: that between directly accessible meaning and meaning accessible
only by inference. It is the difference between understandingand interpreting.
The hermeneuticist whose philosophy is expressed by Foucault recognizes no
difference between the act ofinterpreting, which is an intellectual operation by
an active mind, and the fact of understanding, which is neither an act nor a
performance but the possession of a capacity. This hermeneuticist takes a
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The problem with the interpretivist (subjectivist) response to the
failure of objectivism is identified by what has come to be known as
the "infinite regress argument."" Wittgenstein puts it this way:
"But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point?
Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the
rule.'--That is not what we ought to say, but rather: any
interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it
interprets, and cannot give it any support.
Interpretations by
47
themselves do not determine meaning.
Why does Wittgenstein question the importance ofinterpretation
for meaning?' s His point is that if the understanding of an
utterance or sign were a matter of advancing an interpretation
(which is just another utterance or sign) then the interpretation
itself would require its own interpretation, and so on, infinitely."9
capacity to be an act and, like the fact of taking the Pireus to be a man, it is an
error of category, therefore a metaphysical error. Or, as Wittgenstein would
say, a grammatical misunderstanding. We may also note that the distinction
in question is also overlooked by those hermeneuticists inspired not directly by
Nietzsche but by Heidegger. For them, too, to understand is already to
interpret.
Vincent Descombes, Nietzsche's FrenchMoment, in WHY WEARENOTNIIMSCHEANS 80 (Luc
Ferry & Alain Renaut eds., Robert de Loaiza trans., 1997).
46. Saul Kripke made this argument the basis of his controversial reading of
Wittgenstein. SAUL A- KRIPKE, WrITGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982)
(arguing for a skeptical reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following). For a legal
application of the skeptical misreading of Wittgenstein, see Mark Tushnet, Following the
Rules Laid Down:A Critiqueof InterpretivismandNeutral Principles,96 HARv. L. REV. 781,
825 (1983).
47. WrrIGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 198; see also ROBERT BRANDOM,
MAKING IT EXPLICIT 508-09 (1994) ("Linguistic understanding depends on interpretation...
only in extraordinary situations-where different languages are involved, or where ordinary
communication has broken down.").
48. Consider James Tully, Wittgenstein and PoliticalPhilosophy, 17 POL. THEORY 172,

196 (1988):
[Interpretation] is a practice we engage in when our understanding and use of
signs is in some way problematic or in doubt. Here we attempt to come to an
understanding of the sign in question by offering various interpretations
(expressions) as opposedto different ones, adjudicating rival interpretations, in
some cases calling the criteria of adjudication into question, and so on....
Interpretation should thus be seen as one important practice of critical
reflection among many, resting comfortably in more basic ways of acting with
words (self-understandings) that cannot themselves be interpretations.
49. Wittgenstein makes a second argument about interpretation which builds on the
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The infinite regress argument is not designed to, and should not,
move us to a point of frustration or failure. Rather, Wittgenstein
urges us to rethink the notion that before we can understand an
utterance we must first interpret it. As he says, "there is a way of
grasping a rule which is not an interpretation......o

There are few voices in contemporary legal theory speaking on
behalf of objectivism.5" More vocal, and more numerous, are the
voices of subjectivism.52 Subjectivism, I have argued, is a natural
response to the failure of objectivism. Its ubiquity notwithstanding,
subjectivism is a troubled and troubling philosophical stance.
Whatever one's metaphysics, subjectivism eats away at our
aspirations for law. We want law to be more than opinion, collective
or otherwise. The question whether a legal standard has or has not
been violated should turn on more than the caprice of who is asked
regress argument. This is the paradox of interpretation.
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The
answer was; if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can
also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor
conflict here.
WITrGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 201. The paradox is that "[g]iven the fact
of multiple interpretations, for any action, that action can be characterized both in a way
that accords with a given rule and conflicts with it-even if the interpretation of the rule
itself were transparent." WILLIAMS, supranote 22, at 160. It is perhaps due to the difficulties
presented by the paradox of interpretation that Wittgenstein introduces the idea of a
practice. Anthony O'Hear states that:
It is my contention that Wittgenstein introduces the practice of a community
into his analysis of rule-following in order to put a stop to the difficulties that
arise from the insight that on some interpretation, anything can be seen as
following from a rule, difficulties which would dog my individualistic attempt
to follow out the implications of a self-imposed rule, whether or not I was
interested in communicating my understanding of the rule to others.
Anthony O2Hear, Wittgenstein and the Transmission of Traditions, in WTrlGENsTEIN
CENTENNARY ESSAYS 41, 47 (1991).

50. WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 201.
51. Other than Michael Moore, I would note only Ernest Weinrib. ERNEST WEINRIB, THE
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) (arguing for an inherent moral order to private law).
52. There are many facets of subjectivism, from the rejection ofobjectivity as a value to
the embrace of "identity politics" in legal theory. Movements or schools of thought include
Critical Race Theory, strong versions of "narrative" scholarship, and proponents of radical
indeterminacy. Exemplars are mentioned in Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, THE NEw
REPUBLIC, Oct. 13,1997, at 40-43 ("Every intellectual movement has a lunatic fringe. Radical
legal egalitarianism is distinguished by having a rational fringe and a lunatic core.")
(reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & SUzANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997)).
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to decide the matter. Providing an alternative to objectivism that
avoids the excesses of subjectivism is the task at hand. Let us turn
to that endeavor.
II. FORMS OF EXPLANATION: CAUSAL AND NORMATIVE

Objectivism and subjectivism are both attempts to explain the
normativity of rule-following. Objectivism searches for the means
by which disparate applications of a rule (or concept) can be said to
be applications of the "same" standard. Subjectivism despairs of
ever finding the Holy Grail of objectivism and resorts to individual
and collective subjectivity to explain the phenomenon of rulefollowing and, hence, normativity. Despite their differences,
objectivism and subjectivism share one fundamental: each theory
adheres to the thesis that rule-following is an operation of mind.
For the objectivist, the mind grasps the external measure of
compliance. For the subjectivist, rule-following is the result of
individual proclivity or the consensus of similarly-inclined subjects.
The central insight that enables us to break free of the existing
debate is this: rule-following is not a mental phenomenon.
Consistent with his critique ofpsychologism, Wittgenstein relocates
normativity in action, specifically social action. A complete
articulation of normativity as a social phenomenon leads to a
surprising result: a new conception of objectivity.5 3 As we shall see,
objectivity is neither a property, nor a relation: it is a collective
achievement. In short, objectivity is produced and not found.
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein overcomes the
limits of the objectivism/subjectivism debate by asking a different
question. This question enables him to break new ground in our
understanding of normativity and, ultimately, objectivity. He
writes:
Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule-say a signpost-got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there
here?-Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to
this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.54

53. See infra notes 110-38 and accompanying text.
54. WrTrGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 198.
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The remark is met with an immediate objection from
Wittgenstein's imaginary interlocutor: "But that is only to give a
causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by
the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in.""
But Wittgenstein's point is.that the sign-post exists as such by
virtue not of training but by virtue of a social practice, a custom.5"
He states: "On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person
goes by a sign-post only insofar as there exists a regular use of signposts, a custom."57 What Wittgenstein is pointing to here is the
connection between meaning and training. The meaning of the
signpost is a "social" meaning: it is in the regular use of the signpost
that normativity (correct and incorrect use of the signpost) is
established. And how do we understand "correct" and "incorrect?"
This is where training comes in. Wittgenstein maintains that the
key to normativity lies in the ways in which we have been trained
to respond to the sign or rule. The philosophical challenge is to
extract an account of normativity from the details of training.
Normativity is concerned not with how we make judgments of
correctness and incorrectness, but in what those judgments
consist.5" An example will help make the point. Consider a chess
55. Id. The mistake identified here is often made. The error lies in trying to explain how
to do something correctly or incorrectly by appealing to a causal story regarding training. A
good example of this is Stanley Fish's use of the idea of "interpretive communities." Fish
accounts for different persons being in the same interpretive community by appealing to a
story about training. FISH, supra note 37, at 141 (In addition to facility in a language, one
needs to be in possession of a certain structure of interests, described by Professor Fish as
"distinctions, categories of understanding, and stipulations of relevance and irrelevance ...."
These are acquired, Professor Fish tells us, "only after one has 'passed through a professional
initiation or course oftraining' whose effect is to homogenize persons who were disparate and
heterogeneous before entering-and becoming inhabited by-the community's ways."). The
problem is that the narrative about training does not illuminate what seeing the world the
same way means. It is only an account of the training involved. For a detailed account of this
error, see PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 39, at 99-127.
56. Wittgenstein's conclusion is that "'obeying a rule' is a practice." WITrGENSTEIN,
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 202.
57. Id. § 198.
58. For discussion of normative explanation, see GORDON B. BAKER & PETER M.S.
HACKER, LANGUAGE, SENSE & NONSENSE (1984), who note that:
A normative explanation, therefore, explains a normative act, a normative
situation, or a normative consequence by reference to some relevant rule or
aspect of a rule. The manner in which the rule is invoked in, or involved in, the
explanation will vary from case to case according to the nature of the question.
Since such explanations are not causal (i.e. do not serve as explanations in
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match between Smith and Jones. Jones is a good player, but Smith
is said to be better. Each time Smith makes a move, he engages in
all the normal mental processes that lead up to his decision of
which piece to move and where to move it on the board. In addition,
Smith has to remember where every other piece is on the board for,
as it turns out, Smith is blind.
How Smith makes a correct move (the causal account) is a
logically distinct question from whether he makes a correct move
(the normative account). When it comes to normativity, our interest
is not in how Smith is able to do what he does. This is not to deny
that what Smith is able to do is impressive-but from the point of
view of normativity, it is of no interest. The reason it is of no
interest is that how someone does something does not tell us to
what his "doing" amounts, that is, of what it consists, nor does it
tell us whether the act is correct or incorrect. 9 Standards for the
correct/incorrect, successful/unsuccessful doing of anything are not
a matter of how the doing is accomplished (causal explanation).
Nothing in Smith's head can tell us whether he has moved a piece
correctly. For this, we must look elsewhere.
A causal account of a practice or activity fails to explain what
constitutes correct and incorrect action, e.g., following a rule.60 By
virtue of subsuming an individual case under a general causal law), we do not
seek these explanations by experimental observations and inductions. If we
want to know what rules inform certain activities and give them meaning, we
typically ask the participants.Their specifications of what rules they are
following or are trying to follow typically have an authoritative status. An
agent's sincere assertion that he was making a promise, kicking a goal, buying
a ticket, checking his opponentes king, voting for the amendment to the motion,
and so on, or that he was trying to effect these acts, are not hypotheses. And
such an agent's explanation of what makes his utterance a promise, his kick a
goal, his handing over money a purchase, etc. are not theories which he
concocts on the basis of past observations. They are rather explanations of the
rules which he is following or trying to follow.
Id, at 258.
59. For discussion of the immanent role of rules in training, see PETER M.S. HACKER,
WrrIrGENSTEIN'S PLACE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 209 (1996) ("The
relevance of teaching is not causal or genetic, but rather immanent: 'what matters is what
isgiven in the explanation!.")(quoting WITi'GENSTEIN'S LECTURES, CAMBRIDGE 1930-32: FROM
THE NOTES OF JOHN KINGAND DESmoND LEE 38 (Desmond Lee ed., 1980)).

60. The meaningful character of action cannot be reduced to physical phenomena such
as bodily movement, brain waves, behaviorist responses, or other materialist grounds. For
the hermeneutic tradition, this is expressed by the question "Is there a sense in which
interpretation is essential to explanation in the sciences of man?" See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR,
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emphasizing the social character of rules and the role of training in
understanding how the correct/incorrect distinction is inculcated,
Wittgenstein moves us to the following two conclusions. First, the
normativity of rules is forged in community agreement over time.
The second is epistemic-we normally follow °rules
"unreflectively."6 ' Rules of courtesy, driving, and the like are never
the product of anything save our instinctive sense of
appropriateness. The logic of our actions, and our ability to
understand our actions as "rule-governed," presupposes a social
context in which the regularities, customs, and patterns of action
over time are found.62 Some elaboration is in order.
Judgments of correctness and incorrectness are an everyday
feature of social life. How do we go about making such judgments?
And how should we characterize or account for judgments of
correctness and incorrectness? Finally, what do we mean when we
characterize the statements, behavior, and assertions of others?
In many, but by no means all, situations in which we characterize
the action of others as correct or mistaken, we appeal to rules. For
example, when a person speeds through a red light at an
intersection, we say that by his action the person has violated the
motor vehicle laws. Were our judgment to be challenged, we would
cite the rule requiring one to stop at a red traffic signal and the fact
that the person in question failed to stop. Here we want to say that
the statement "X violated the Motor Vehicle Code" is true. The
truth of the statement is not a matter of opinion. "Objectivity"
names the difference between one's thinking a rule has been
violated and its in fact having been violated.
I have said that it is through the use of rules that we distinguish
between correct and incorrect action. How is it that rules enable us
to make such judgments? In other words, what is it about rules that
we may successfully employ them in appraisive activities such as
judging the actions of others? What is required is an account of the
Interpretationand the Sciences ofMan, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (PHILOSOPHYAND THE
HUMAN SCIENCES) 28 (1985) (analyzing practices such as negotiation and voting to make the

point that meaningful human action is not reducible to physical phenomena: interpretation
is essential to meaning).
61. For discussion of this point in the context of law, see Philip Bobbitt, What It Means
to Follow a Rule of Law, in RULES & REASONING: ESSAYS IN HONOUROF FRED SCHAUER 55-60

(Linda Meyer ed., 1999).
62. WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 169.
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normativity of rules, one that explains and justifies claims for a
social basis of normativity.
IlI. THE SOCIAL BASIs OF NORMATIVITY

If normativity is not reducible to causality, does that mean that
no connection exists between the two? For Wittgenstein, the fact
that we are trained in certain ways does not answer the question
whether, in a given circumstance, we are acting in accord with the
appropriate norm. Yet Wittgenstein maintains that an element of
the causal story-training-holds the key to normativity.63
Unpacking the connection between training and normativity reveals
an important connection between the normativity of rules and
community agreement (properly understood). As we will see, action
replaces both metaphysical foundations (objectivism) and
community consensus (subjectivism) in the explanation of
normativity and, ultimately, objectivity itself.
Before we turn to the role of training (specifically in the legal
context), one preliminary matter needs to be addressed. The
question can be put simply- Is it an essential aspect of normativity
that rule-following requires an actual practice?' When
Wittgenstein says "there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an
interpretation,"' the question we need to ask is whether the act of
grasping a rule can take place independent of an actual practice.
Consider the practice of law. If normativity exists only in actual
practices, and we accept law as a practice, then the task of
jurisprudence becomes importantly descriptive, 66 for we cannot

63. Wittgenstein, Investigations, supra note 26, § 190 (indicating the criterion for how
to apply a formula lies in "the way we are taught to use t").
64. For an argument that an "internal relation7 does the normative work of connecting
a rule and its applications, see G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACxER,'WITTGENSTEIN: RuLs,
GRAMmAR AND NECEssrTy 102-03 (1985) [hereinafter BAKER & HACKER, GRAmmAR]
(containing commentary on Wittgenstein's P uLSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Volume 2).
65. WrIrGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26,

§ 201.

66. H.L.A. Hart had a similar insight. This may be why he described his work in THE

CONCEPT OF LAW as "descriptive sociology." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW v (2d ed.
1994) ("Notwithstandingits concern with analysis the book [THE CONCEPT OFLAW] may also
be regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology...."). The task ofphilosophy is noncognitive.
Hacker, supra note 59, at 110 ("The Investigations delineates a purified non-cognitive
conception of philosophy.").
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know what rules "mean"apart from an actual practice of law." This
is what I mean when I say the focus should shift from mind to
action. In short, apart from an actual community of legal rulefollowers, it is impossible for an individual to discern whether he or
she is following a rule, interpreting a rule, or correcting error.'
It is clear that Wittgenstein believed that, to be meaningful, rules
must be used repeatedly, and over time. He wrote: "Is what we call
'obeying a rule' something that it would be possible for only one man
to do, and to do only once in his life?... It is not possible that there
should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a
69
rule."
Could
a radically-isolated
individual-say, Robinson
Crusoe-follow rules in much the same way as one does in normal
social contexts? The literature on the question is vast,70 but the
explanatory options are well-defined. According to two leading
philosophical commentators, solitary rule-followers require
"regularitiesofaction of sufficient complexity to yield normativity."7 '
Where do we find such complexity? In other words, must rulefollowing be both public and social?
Consider the following pattern:
_..7271...Imagine Robinson
Crusoe using this pattern to decorate the walls of his house. As he
applies the pattern on and around his walls, he applies the pattern
uniformly, keeps the lines level, and corrects any errors in
application which require reapplication or other emendation of his
work. We can evaluate what Crusoe is doing just as if he were here
among us. Likewise, he can apply the pattern just as we might. It
is as though he were one of us.
67. Williams, supranote 22, at 183 ("What is correct is shown in what we do."); PHILIP
BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIONALINTERPRErTATION24 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION]

("Law is something we do, not something we have as a consequence of something we do.").
68. See WrITGENSTEIN, FOUNDATIONS, supranote 1,Part VI § 41 ("The word 'agreement'
and the word 'rule' are related,they are cousins. The phenomena of agreement and of acting
according to a rule hang together.").
69. WrIGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 199.
70. A representative sample of the various points of view is found in HOLTZMAN & LEICH,
supra note 26. The most controversial work on Wittgenstein and rule-following is KRIPKE,
supra note 46. A thorough critique of Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein is G.P. BAKER &
P.M.S. HACKER, SCEPTICISM, RULES& LANGUAGE 1-55 (1984) [hereinafter BAKER& HACKER,

SCEPTICISM].
71. BAKER & HACKER, ScEPrICSim, supranote 70, at 42.
72. This is borrowed from WITTGENSTEIN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, Part VI § 41.

2001]

NORMATIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY IN LAW

347

But think about this from the point of view of "corrective
behavior." How does Crusoe decide whether or not he has made a
"mistake"? And how does he decide what constitutes "correction" of
"error"? Is it not the case that the evaluation of Crusoe's behavior
as correct or incorrect issues not from some neutral standpoint but
from assimilation of his behavior into our practices?" Imagine if we
were able to view Crusoe's work, and saw that after every use of a
dot he used six dashes? If we were to claim that he had erred in his
use of the pattern, we would appeal to nothing beyond our way of
using the pattern. "Correct" use of the pattern begs the normative
question. Without appeal to some way of using the formula, the
meaning of "correct" and "incorrect" does not seem to take hold.74
Wittgenstein tells us as much when he rejects characterization
of Crusoe's conduct as "rule-following": "There might be a cave-man
who produced regularsequences of marks for himself. He amused
himself, e.g., by drawing on the wall of the cave:
or

.

.

.

But he is not following the general

expression of a rule."75
Why are we precluded from characterizing Crusoe's conduct as
following a rule, i.e. engaging in normative behavior? Apart from a
practice of use, Crusoe has only "the master pattern." He could
interpret it as he sees fit but, as we saw earlier, interpretation
73. Without a public practice ofapplication, Crusoe cannot distinguish between applying
the pattern and merely thinking he is applying the pattern. The argument about the need
for a public language extends even to the language of sensation. See ROGER TRIGG,
UNDERSTANDINGSOCIAL SCIENCE:APHILOSOPICALINTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCFS
26 (2d ed. 2001).
How do we learn the word pain.' We can all communicate with each other about
pain and teach the word, but it apparently refers to a private sensation.
Wittgenstein was concerned to show how the meaning of such a word can only
be rooted in a public language, with public checks that it is being used correctly.
He was looking for a'criterion of correctness,' and argued that one cannot have
a private rule for using a word. In that case there would be no distinction
between my having a rule which I kept, and my having a rule which I thought
I was keeping even when I was not. The rules of the private language could not
be impressionsof rules.
Id- (footnotes omitted). Wittgenstein's argument against a private language is found in
WrrTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supranote 26, §§ 243-81.
74. See BARRYSTROUD, MEANING, UNDERSTANDING, AND PRACTICE 83 (2000) ("For there

to be ... correctness and incorrectness of performance there must be some practice or pattern
of behaviour which an individual's actions either do or do not conform to.").
75. WITTGENSTEIN, FOUNDATIONS, supranote 1, Part VI § 41.
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cannot provide grounds for meaning.7" The only other alternative,
one we have also rejected,7 7 is the idea that the master pattern is
"self-interpreting;" that its meaning can be discerned, as it were, in
the abstract.7 8 This leaves us with the conclusion that the meaning
of the pattern, like the meaning of the signpost, and legal
standards, is a function of use; of our practices. Wittgenstein says
as much when, at the end of his analysis of rule-following, he states
"'obeying a rule' is a practice."7 9
The normativity of rule-following-the ground of correctness and
incorrectness-is not to be found in the agreement of others as
such."0 Agreement is a necessary feature of the normativity of our
practices, but the "agreement" must be regularity in reaction to
use."' In short, when we say there must be "agreement in actions"
what we are really saying is that there must be harmony in
application, over time. This harmony in reaction and application is
constitutive of legal practice and, thus, is the basis of our legal
judgments.8 2
76. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
77. See supranotes 20.32 and accompanying text.
78. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 175 ("Wittgenstein's point is that a rule or masterpattern is such only from within a practice that is itselfa kind of complex regularity, namely,
community regularity as expressed in agreement in action and judgment.").
79. WrITGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supranote 26, § 202.
80. For discussion of the relationship between normativity and "consensus," see DAVID
BLOOR, WITrGENSTEIN: RULES AND INSTrrUTIONS (1997). He notes that:
[un following a rule we move automatically from case to case, guided by our
instinctive (but socially educated) sense of'sameness.' Such a sense does not
itself suffice to create a standard of right and wrong. It is necessary to introduce
a sociological element into the account to explain normativity. Normative
standards come from the consensus generated by a number of interacting rule
followers, and it is maintained by collectively monitoring, controlling and
sanctioning their individual tendencies. Consensus makes norms objective, that
is, a source of external and impersonal constraint on the individual. It gives
substance to the distinction between rule followers thinking they have got it
right, and their having really got it right.
Id. at 17.
81. This is precisely the point at which a theory like Stanley Fish's Reader-Response
theory founders. Fish is right to reject practice-transcendent accounts of meaning but wrong
in thinking that the collective presuppositions of members of an interpretive community are
the key to meaning. For discussion of this point, see PATIERSON, TRUTH, supra note 39, at
99-127.
82. WILLIAMS, supranote 22, at 176.
It is in this sense that community agreement is constitutive of practices, and
that agreement must be displayed in action. There are two important features
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Harmony in action is a function of an intersubjective grammar of
appraisal, one that is used consistently and over time. Grammar is
immanent in our practices.' It is agreement in reaction among
participants to occasions for the use of this grammar that enables
us to follow rules, appraise action, and engage in the multiple
normative practices of rule-following. But from where does this
grammar-specifically legal grammar-come? And how is its use
inculcated in participants? For answers, we must return to training
but this time in the context of law.
IV. THE NORMATIVITY OF LAW
Consider the most basic of learning tasks. Even something as
simple as basic arithmetic requires instruction, which itself
includes correction of error. Training takes a novice and inculcates
a skill. In many activities, skills are imparted by one fully
competent in the practice and capable of transmitting those skills
to an initiate. When asked to describe why the student carries out
the mathematical series as she does, she is likely to answer "That

about this account that need to be highlighted. First, it is the social practice
that provides the structure within which individual understanding can obtain
or individual judgment be made. Central to Wittgenstein's thought is the claim,
repeatedly argued for, that no isolated event or behavior can correctly be

described as naming or obeying or understanding. The rule as formula, the
standard as chart, or the paradigm as an instance have no normative or
representational status in their own right. They have this status only in virtue
of the way the formula or the chart or the instance is used. It is the use that
creates the structured context within which sign-posts point, series can be
continued, orders obeyed and paradigms be exemplary. Only then can we see
a particular action as embodying or instancing a grammatical structure. In
short, the mandatory stage setting is social practice.
Second, community agreement does not constitute a justification for
particular judgments. What is indispensable for correct, or appropriate,
judgment and action is that there is concord, not that each individual justifies
his (or anyone else's) judgment and action by appeal to its harmony with the
judgment ofothers.
Id. (footnote omitted).
83. The understanding of language from an immanent perspective is a hallmark of the
later work of Wittgenstein. ROBERT JOHN ACKRMANN, WrrrGENSTEIN'S CnTY 8 (1988)
("Wittgenstein always operated with an immanent understanding oflanguage, according to
which, when we have a puzzle that seems to call for philosophical treatment, some localized
language use is recognized as perfectly clear, and other language use as obscure.").
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is how I was taught to do it." 4 We might say that "how we are
trained, how we learn, is constitutive of what we mean."85
Understanding the normativity of our practices requires attention
to the ways in which we are trained to employ the rules of the
game. In this way, we can explicate the connection between rules
and action, thereby grounding normativity in the latter. As I will
show, the philosophical task is ultimately descriptive:
we seek
86
nothing less than a perspicuous view of legal practice.
A look at training in the legal context brings us to the normative
dimension of law. While complicated and richly varied, legal
training provides novice lawyers with a unique set of argumentative
skills.8 " The practical dimension of lawyering is a matter of
producing persuasive arguments to the effect that one's assertions
about what the law permits, requires, or prohibits are correct. 88
How do lawyers do this? How do lawyers show the truth of legal
propositions?
As Ronald Dworkin has noted, legal argument is a matter of
assertion."9 But how, in the law, do we go from asserting a legal
proposition to sustaining a claim of truth? I treat the word "Claim"
84. WrrrGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 190 ("It may now be said: The way
the formula is meant determines which steps are to be taken.' What is the criterion for the
way the formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we
are taught to use it.").
85. WILLIAMS,supranote 22, at 179.
86. This is the proper task of philosophy. See PETER M.S. HACKER, WITT"GENSTEIN 9
(1997) ("The only kinds of explanation in philosophy are explanations by
description-descriptionof the use of words.").
87. This is not to deny that other skills are imparted. I would go so far as to say, however,
that if the argumentative skills were not imparted, legal education would be incomplete.
88. This means that a practice-based account of law is an extension of a general account
of the role of practices in creating meaningful discourses. Stephen Turner notes that:
Our powers of persuasion and explanation, it seems, stop at the borders of our
own localities. It is our sharedpractices that enable us to be persuaded and
persuade, to be explainers, or tojustify and have the justifications accepted. But
the same justifications would not be accepted for a Roman, and thus there is no
universal touchstone to which we could both refereitherour disputes or failures
of mutual understanding. The same holds true for the law. The point of legal
training is to inculcate skills, skills that enable a lawyer to understand and
formulate legal reasons and distinctions.
STEPHEN TURNER, THE SOCIAL THEORY OF PRACTICES 11 (1994).
89. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 14, at 4 (describing legal propositions as
"statements and claims people make about what the law allows or prohibits or entitles them
to have").
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as a term of art.9" Consider the claim "Smith's will is invalid." This
Claim asserts that, as a matter of law, Smith's will cannot be an
instrument for probate transfer of her property. To sustain the
claim of invalidity, more is required than mere assertion of the
Claim (proposition of law). There has to be a reason supporting the
claim of legal invalidity.
Suppose Smith's will is witnessed by only one person. This is the
Ground of the Claim that Smith's will is invalid. The Ground
supports the Claim. The relation may be represented this way:
Ground

0 Claim

To show the truth of the Claim more than the Ground is required.
Grounds function as reasons, but reasons of a special sort. In this
case, the Ground is a fact (i.e., that Smith's will has only one
witness). What is it that makes that fact significant? The answer
is a Warrant.
A Warrant connects a Ground with a Claim. The Warrant makes
the Ground significant vis-A-vis the Claim. In this case, the
Warrant is the Statute of Wills, for in that statute one will find the
appropriate Warrant, specifically the provision requiring two
witnesses to a will. We may represent the relations between Claim,
Ground, and Warrant thus:
Ground

I

Claim

Warrant
It is a commonplace that statutory texts are not self-executing.
All texts, especially legal texts, must be construed. The way we give
90. The framework that follows (Claim, Ground, Warrant, Backings) is taken from
STEPHENTOtLm ETAL.,ANINTRoDUCTIONTO REASONING 23-67 (1979). The approach was
originally advanced by Toulmin in STEPHEN EDELSTON TOULwIN, THE USES OF ARGUiENT
(1958). For an exemplary employment of the of the framework in the field of theology, see
NANEY C. MURPHY, REASONINGAND RHETORIC IN RELIGION (1994). I discuss this approach
to legal argument in PATTERSON, TRUTH, supranote 39, at 169-75.
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meaning to legal rules is with Backings. 9 This process is one of
application; it is the way legal rules come to have meaning. There
are four principal Backings (I shall call them "forms of argument")
for legal Warrants. These forms of argument are: Textual,
Historical, Doctrinal, and Prudential.9 2 While certain departments
of law may have additional forms of argument," these four-which
were present in the English Common Law9 4 -are found in every

91. This is a corollary of the point Wittgenstein makes when he says "obeying a rule' is
a practice." WrrrGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 202. Andrew Lugg elaborates:
There is no such thing as a rule that fixes how it is to be followed (or a selfinterpreting signpost). Far from determining its own application, a rule can
always be interpreted in more than one way. Not even a straightforward rule
about the use ofa word dictates how it is to be obeyed. 'Use the word "game" to
apply to competitive activities involving skill, chance and endurance' no more
fixes its own application than a signpost to Paris fixes how it is to be followed.
The rule does not tell us that 'competitive' is to be understood as involving
conflict, not cooperation, any more than the signpost to Paris tells us to go in
the direction of the finger, not in the opposite direction ....
(It is no argument
against this observation that signs that exert forces making us go where they
point fix their applications. Following such a sign is a natural phenomenon on
a par with the Moon's tracking the Earth as it goes around the Sun. It is not a
phenomenon involving interpretation, never mind one that can be sensibly
praised or blamed.)
ANDREW LuGG,W=GrGENSTEIN'S INVESTIGATIONS 1-133, 146 (2000).
92. The idea offorms ofargument or "modalities" was developed in the American context
by Philip Bobbitt. See PHILIP BOBBrIr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); BOBBITT,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 67. Bobbitt identifies six forms of argument (he refers to them
as "modalities") in constitutional law. Two not mentioned above, structural and ethical
arguments, are, in my view, unique to constitutional law. For discussion ofinterpretation in
the context of German law, see KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
312-65 (6th ed. 1991).
93. I have in mind the structural and ethical forms of argument in constitutional law.
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 67, at 73-75, 80-81.
94. See BOBBrIT, INTERPRETATION, supranote 67, at 5 ("The ways in which Americans
interpret the Constitution could have been different.... For Americans, however, these ways
have taken the forms of common law argument, those forms prevailing at the time of the
drafting and ratification of the US Constitution."); NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW
373 (1997) ("The common law today is what it has been since since it crystallized in the
fourteenth century."); H. Jefferson Powell, ConstitutionalInvestigations,72 TEM L. REV.
1731, 1737 (1994) ("There is nothing sacred or philosophically fundamental about these
modes; they derive historically from the professional discourse of early-modern English
common lawyers, and over time they may change.") (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
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department of law.95 The argumentative structure of legal
argument-the grammatical skeleton-may be represented thus:
Ground

Claim

_

Warrant

t
Backings
Consider the most common form of argument, textual
argument.' Textual argument is not about plain meaning or the
like. Rather, it is simply taking the meaning of words at face value
(ordinary meaning).97 For example, when parties to a contract
reduce their agreement to writing, the writing is the first place to
go for an answer to the question "What is the parties' agreement?"
The same is true of trust instruments. The settlor of the trust
expresses her intentions in words, which are given their ordinary
meaning." Finally, even in constitutional law-as complicated as
it can sometimes be-textual argument plays a prominent role. Few
95. E.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Jury'sRole in DecidingNormativeIssues in the American
Common Law, 68 FORDHAML. REV. 407 (1999); Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful
Arts, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 515 (1997); Carlos Manuel Vkqueg, Laughing at Treaties, 99
COLUM. L. Rlv. 2154 (1999).
96. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation,100 HARV.L. REV. 1189,1195 (1987) ("Arguments from textplay auniversally
accepted role in constitutional debate.").
97. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 11
(1991) ("Constitutional commentators sometimes seem to forget that history serves to
illuminate the text, but that only the text itself is law.").
98. Bobbitt compares the reading of trust instruments and written constitutions in
BOBBrTP, INTERPRETATION, supra note 67, at 4 ("[A] written constitution is like a trust
agreement. It specifies what powers the trustees are to have and it endows those agents with
certain authority delegated by the settlor who created the trust.").
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constitutional issues are resolved without perusal of the
Constitution's text. Of course, this analysis is not likely to end the
discussion, but in many instances, textual argument plays a
necessary role.
Historical argument is the form of argument one often encounters
in the context of constitutional law. In constrding a particular
clause or provision of the Constitution, the reader seeks the
meaning the terms in question had for those who authored the
provision." In the context of statutory interpretation, historical
analysis focuses on the aspirations of the legislative body that
promulgated the text in question."° Doctrinal argument represents
a record of past efforts to discern the meaning of texts (statutes,
etc.) as well as divining principles that can be said to "inform" prior
decisions. The variety of ways of coming to terms with past
decisions (e.g., analogy) is the province of doctrinal argument.'0 1 Of
course, an important dimension of0 doctrinal
argument is discerning
2
when mistakes have been made.'
Finally, there is prudential argument. Prudential arguments
focus on the effects or consequences of deciding a case one way
rather than another.' 3 Prudential arguments are, in effect,
arguments of policy: the pursuit of collective goals.' The most
common form of appeal is to economy-decision one way raises the
costs ofjudicial administration without a correlative benefit. 10 5
99. For a superb treatment ofhistorical argument in the context ofclaims for Originalism

in constitutional interpretation, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof
OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).

100. A sophisticated account ofthe vicissitudes of historical argument is found in William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).

101. Arguments from "precedent" are not limited to those originating in case law.
BOBBIT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 67, at 18 ("T]here are also precedents of other

institutions, e.g., the practices ofearlier Presidents as well as the various corollaries incident
to fashioning rules on the basis of precedent").
102. See DWORKIN, SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 118-23.

103. The most sophisticated example of an emphasis on this form of argument in
constitutional scholarhship is MARKTUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICALANALYSIS

OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988) (evaluating forms of argument as "ideologies" from the point
of view of prudential argument).
104. In the course of his commentary on Bobbitt's approach to constitutional law, Richard
Markovits makes a compelling axiological case for the limits of prudential argument in law.
RICHARD MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE LEGAL ARGUMENT AND
CONSTIt'rONAL ADJUDICATION 60-74 (1998).
105. For discussion of this point in the context of the common law process, see MELVIN
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The importance of the forms of argument is quite simple: without
them rule-following and, thus, law is impossible."° How can this
be? Rules are not self-executing. Like Wittgenstein's signpost, we
have to know how to act with rules. The forms of argument are the
ways in which we make meaning with rules (or do meaningful
things with rules). The forms of argument make it possible for us
to engage in the myriad activities we call "law" (e.g., arguing,
asserting, deciding). The forms are the very thing that give law its
normativity, for they enable us to show how assertions are correct
and incorrect, true and false. The forms are the grammar of law."7
I began this part by connecting normativity with training. When
we look at training in law, a distinct grammar of argument
emerges. That grammar-the forms of legal argument-is the
shared, intersubjective basis of legal judgment. The normativity of
law depends upon an identifiable grammar of justification and
consistent recognition (agreement) among participants in the
practice that these are the forms of legal appraisal.""8 In addition to
agreement on the forms themselves, it is crucial that participants
in our legal practice agree in their reactions to the use of the
forms. 0 9 As we shall see directly, agreement in judgment is an
essential component of objectivity, and not always easy to come by.

ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAw 144 (1988) (discussing competing
interests of doctrinal consistency and pragmatism).
106. The forms of argument are themselves neither true nor false. They are the means for
making true and false assertions (similarly, consider arithmetic functions).
107. One commentator states that:
Anyone who failed to acknowledge the relevance ofthe various argument forms
to the enterprise ofjustifying claims based on a legal text would, quite frankly,
lack a rational capacity, in the same way as would a person who did not admit
the relevance ofvisual observation to justifying claims about the naturalworld.
Brian Winters, Logicand Legitimacy: The Uses of ConstitutionalArgument,48 CASEW. RES.

L. REV. 263,306(1998).
108. For important discussion of this point in the context of internal and external
approaches to law as a practice, see Thomas Morawetz, UnderstandingDisagreement,The
Root Issue of Jurisprudence:Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and
Judging,141 U. PA. L. REV. 371,378-79 (1992) ("I refer to individuals within the practice as

having a commitment to a particular interpretive strategy for applying rules and norms in
the light of a conception of the purposes they serve.").
109. I am not suggesting that there is always agreement over every use of the forms of
argument. Disagreement is a pervasive feature of legal practice. But if there were no
agreement in the use of the forms of argument, disagreement would be impossible.
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V. NORMATIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY

We come, then, to objectivity. If the forms of argument are the
normative grammar of law, how do they engender objectivity? One
might think this question has already been answered. If we
understand "objectivity" as an account of the difference between
one's thinking one is following a legal norm and one's in fact
following the norm then, indeed, the question has been answered.
By linking normativity to public forms of argument, we identify the
means by which actors in a practice such as law conduct their
discourse in constitutive, intersubjective terms.110 Legal norms are
objective to the degree the forms of argument continue to be
recognized as legitimate forms of legal justification. The forms of
argument are a culturally endorsed form of legal appraisal. They
"exist" only to the extent they continue to be employed by the "caste
of lawyers." 1 '
But perhaps this answer fails to satisfy. True, law seems more
"objective" than literary criticism but less objective than science or
arithmetic. What accounts for this sense, and how can it be
explained? It might be objected that while some practices admit of
objective judgment (e.g., arithmetic), law does not. Let us consider
an illustration of this point from the realm of commercial law.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Statute of Frauds
provision, a contract for the sale of goods in an amount greater than
$500 must be in writing, otherwise the contract is unenforceable."
If Smith sues Jones for breach of contract, and the value at stake in
the contract is over $500, Jones may assert the Statute of Frauds
as a defense and move for summary judgment. Jones's claim is that
the contract is unenforceable (Claim). His basis (Ground) for the
claim is the fact that the contract is for an amount in excess of
$500. The Statute of Frauds (Warrant) permits such a defense to
preclude enforcement of the contract against the party to be
charged (Jones). Smith's argument will be the most basic argument

110. See BAKER & HACKER, GRAMMAR, supra note 64, at 170 ( [T]he fundamental issue is
to clarify how a practice yields objective standards for determining what is correct.").
111. Brian Simpson, The CommonLaw and Legal Theory, in LEGALTHEORYAND COMMON
LAW 8,20 (William Twining ed., 1986).
112. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1995).
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of all: the ordinary meaning of the words (Backing-Textual
Argument) of Section 2-201 of the UCC.
From the point ofview of objectivity, there seems to be little room
for disagreement over Jones's assertion of the defense of the
Statute of Frauds. The textual argument is dispositive. There are
exceptions, of course, to the formal requirement of a writing. One
of these is found in UCC Section 2-201(3)(b). It states that notwithstanding the lack of a writing signed by the party to be
charged, a contract is enforceable if the party to be charged "admits
in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for
sale was made.""' How do we use the forms of argument to handle
a more difficult case?
In DF Activities Corp. v. Brown,"' DF sought to purchase a
Frank Lloyd Wright chair owned by Brown. DF contended, and
Brown denied, that Brown agreed by phone to sell the chair for
$60,000, to be paid in two equal installments. DF followed up with
a confirmation letter and a check for $30,000. Two weeks later
Brown returned both with a note indicating that the chair was no
longer available. Brown then sold the chair for $198,000. DF sued
and Brown moved to dismiss, attaching an affidavit stating that she
had never agreed to sell the chair to DF.
The issue was whether, under the Statute of Frauds, a sworn
denial of the existence of a contract ends the case or whether the
plaintiffmay press forward and insist on discovery, intending to use
thejudicial-admission exception' to the statute. Judge Posner held
that once the defendant denies under oath that a contract had been
formed, discovery may not proceed. Posner's argument is pure
prudentialism. He writes: "[Tihe chance that at a deposition the
defendant might be badgered into withdrawing his denial is too
remote to justify prolonging an effort to enforce an oral contract in
the teeth of the statute of frauds.11

113. U.C.C. § 2-201(3Xb).
114. 851 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988).
115. U.C.C. § 2-201(3Xb) (indicating a contract that does not satisfy the requirements of
the Statute of Frauds is enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits
in a pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made).
116. DFActivities Corp., 851 F.2d at 923-24.
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Is there an argument from the other side? In dissent, Judge7
Flaum argued against what he described as a "blanket rule""
against further discovery where the party against whom enforcement is sought denies the existence of a contract. His basis for this
was the simple, yet powerful observation that the rule announced
by the majority renders the testimonial admissions provision
"virtually meaningless."1 18 Sympathetic to the view expressed byhis
colleague (Judge Posner) but mindful of the pull of the text, Judge
Flaum stated his preference for reposing discretion in the hands of
the trial court, eschewing a general, blanket prohibition on
discovery after the critical affidavit is filed.
This example illustrates two things about the normative
character of the forms of legal argument. Judges Posner and Flaum
agree on what text is relevant to the dispute (UCC Section 2-201).
Their disagreement is over how that text is to be construed." 9 The
four forms of argument are always available to show how the text
is to be construed, but the forms do not themselves indicate their
appropriateness to a given case, nor do they tell us what to do when
different forms pull in opposite directions. 12 It is the breakdown of
consensus at this level that fuels claims for lack of objectivity in
law.
As proof of this thesis, one might point to the fact that in matters
arithmetic, consensus is far easier to come by than in law. Why is
it that disagreement-which seems pervasive in law-is
comparatively absent in arithmetic? Are we not permitted to say
117. Id. at 925 (Flaum, J., dissenting) ("A blanket rule prohibiting any further discovery
once the defendant denies under oath that a contract was formed is therefore too inflexible.").
118. Id.
119. Judges Posner and Flaum both employed prudential arguments. The relevant text
posed the issue but contributed nothing to the resolution of the question raised by the
ingenious lawyering of the defendant. The facts of the case actuated neither doctrinal nor
historical arguments.

120. Conflict among the forms of argument is an occasion for interpretation. Bobbitt
resolves the problem of conflict by resort to "conscience." BOBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 67, at 184 ("The recursion to conscience is the crucial activity on which the

constitutional system ofinterpretation that I have described depends."). I criticize this aspect
ofBobbitt's position in Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution,93 COLuM. L. REV.
270, 301-07 (1993) (reviewing BOBBrI T, INTERPRETATION, supra note 67). Richard Fallon

proposes to solve the problem of conflict among the forms of argument by resort to a theory
of coherence. Fallon, supra note 96, at 1237-51. 1 have argued that Fallon's solution-lexical
ordering of the forms of argument--"states, rather than resolves, the problems under
consideration." Patterson, supra at 305 n.111.
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that arithmetic, or for that matter, science, is simply "more
objective" than law?
Could it be that the appearance of objectivity in arithmetic and
its comparable absence in law, is due not to the subject matter but
to desiderata? 1"' In doing sums, there is universal agreement about
what counts as a correct answer. It is not the agreement as such
which "produces" objectivity,'2 2 rather, universal agreement is the
corollary of a prior consensus on criteria of correctness.' In looking
at practices like science and arithmetic, we are tempted to think the
"hardness" of these practices is a function of the objects of
investigation. We are tempted to believe that rocks and theorems
enjoy an ontological and epistemological status that is simply of a
higher order than propositions of law or literary criticism.

121. Richard Rorty, Texts and Lumps, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (OBJECTIVISM,
RELATIvISM, AND TRuTH) 90 (1991) ("I think of objectivity as a matter of ability to achieve
agreement on whether a particular set of desiderata has or has not been satisfied. So I think
that we can have objective knowledge at any level without necessarily having it at any
other."). Rorty's account of the constitutive role of the interaction between the interplay of
causal and intentional elements is instructive:
[An] object can, given a prior agreement on a language game, cause us to hold
beliefs, but it cannot suggest beliefs for us to hold. It can only do things which
our practices will react to with preprogrammed changes in belief. So when he
is asked to interpret the felt difference between hard and soft objects, the
pragmatist says that the difference is between the rules of one institution
(chemistry) and those of another (literary criticism).
Id. at 83-84.
122. This is the subjectivist view of someone like Stanley Fish.
123. See WrrTGENsTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26, § 241 ("So you are saying that
human agreement decides what is true and what is false?'--It is what human beings say that
is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions
but in form of life."); see also RICHARD RORTY, Thomas Kuhn, Rocks and the Law of Physics,
in PHELOSOPHYAND SOCIAL HOPE 175, 179-80 (1999).
The main reason admirers of physics distrust literary critics is that no
consensus ever seems to form about the right interpretation of a text: there is
little convergence of opinion. At the opposite extreme, mathematicians are
usually unanimous aboutwhether or not atheorem has been proved. Physicists
are closer to the mathematics end of the spectrum, and politicians and social
scientists closer to the literary criticism end. Analytic philosophers claimed (not
very plausibly, as things turned out) that analytic philosophers were more
capable of consensus than non-analytic philosophers, and in that sense were
more scientific.
The trouble is that intersubjective agreement about who has succeeded and
who has failed is easy to get if you can lay down criteria of success in advance.
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When the litmus paper turns blue we are inclined to say that the
results of the test are "objective."124 The use of the word seems fine
enough-but it begs the question: What is doing the "normative
heavy lifting," the world or the fact that everyone already agrees on
what it means when the paper turns blue?' This is where the
objectivist wants to give science the advantage and declare that"the
world" has told us what is the case. 6 The "facts" are now known.
Here, again, the causal and the normative are confused. One
cannot, and need not, deny that causal processes are at work, both
in the case of the litmus test and the reading of texts. But I want to
agree with Richard Rorty when he suggests that there is

124. Quine himselfprovides a wonderful example ofhow what we "see" is dependent upon
a network of associations already in place:
[Slomeone mixes the contents oftwo test tubes, observes a green tint, and says
'There was copper in it.' Here the sentence is elicited by a non-verbal stimulus,
but the stimulus depends for its efficacy upon an earlier network ofassociations
of words with words; viz., one's learning of chemical theory .... [T]he verbal
network of an articulate theory has intervened to link the stimulus with the
response.
The intervening theoryis composed of sentences associated with one another
in multifarious ways not easily reconstructed even in conjecture.
WInLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 10-11 (1960).
For further discussion of Quine's thought and its implications for jurisprudence, see
PATTERSON, TRUTH, supranote 39, at 158-59. See also Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth.
Replies to Critics,50 SMU L. REv. 1563, 1589-98 (1997) (responding to Brian Leiter, Why
Quine Is Not a Postmodernist,50 SMU L. REv. 1739 (1997)).
125. For an interesting and informative discussion of the cognitive status of science
against the background of recent work in science studies, see JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE
(1999) (containing an exhaustive analysis ofthe cultural and cognitive dimensions of science
practice). The following characterization of objectivity is relevant to the present discussion:
[The notion of "objective knowledge" is linked with the academic norms of
communalism, universalism, and disinterestedness. The culture built around
these norms in the natural sciences has produced a solid core of established
knowledge. There is no absolutebasis for our belief in the cognitive objectivity
of scientific entities such as gravitating planets, atomic nuclei, tectonic plates
or the genetic code. Nevertheless, this is a well-founded belief, as natural as our
attitude to the rest of the shared furniture of all human lives. What is more,
these are entities that exist independently of our individual thoughts about
them, and operate even-handedly for everyone. This consensus is so
overwhelming that nobody can seriously deny that they are simultaneously
'socially' and 'cognitively' objective in full measure.
Id. at 179 (citations omitted).
126. See Leiter, supranote 124. I reply to Professor Leiter in Patterson, supra note 124,
at 1589-98.
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no way to transfer nonlinguistic brutality to facts, to the truth
of sentences. The way in which a blank takes on the form of the
die which stamps it has no analogy to the relation between the
truth of a sentence and the event which the sentence is about.
When the die hits the blank something causal happens, but as
many facts are brought into the world as there are languages
for describing that causal transaction.1"
There is a well-known anecdote about Wittgenstein wherein he
explained how he first came to his ideas about the relationship of
language to the world '8 It seems Wittgenstein read a magazine
account of a trial in a French court on the question of liability for an
auto accident. 9 By way of explaining how the accident occurred,
one of the lawyers assembled some wooden block figures, each
representing the automobiles involved in the accident as well as the
details of the accident scene. Upon seeingthis arrangement, an idea
came to Wittgenstein: perhaps our words relate to the world in the
same way the figures stand for the participants in the accident.
Words "stand for" things in the world: words are proxies for things.
I want to use the accident scene for a purpose different than that
of Wittgenstein. I want to say that when it comes to the question
"what happened?," there is no single "best" vocabulary or language
of description. The simple accident scene can be described in at
least three different vocabularies, each an expression of what
Hilary Putnam would call "a point of view."130 No one of these points
of view is "correct." 13 1 Each is useful for different purposes. Finally,

127. RORTY, supra note 121, at 81.
128. These ideas were published as LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LoGicoPHMOSOPMICUS (David Pears & Brian McGuinness trans., 1961).
129. The story is recounted in RAY MONK, LUDwIG WITIGENSTEIN: THE DUTY OF GENIUs
118(1990). My thanks to Dr. Peter M.S. Hacker for assistance with this reference.
130. See HILARYPUTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND REALITY 114 (1988):
We can and should insist that some facts are there to be discovered and not
legislated by us. But this is something to be said when one has adopted a way
of speaking, a language, a "conceptual scheme." To talk of "facts without
specifying the language to be used is to talk ofnothing; the word 'fact" no more
has its use fixed by the world itself than does the word "exist" or the word
"object."
131. However, I would argue that within each point of view it is possible to make correct
and incorrect assertions or statements.
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none is reducible one to the other," 2 nor to3 3 the individual
predilections of anyone employing a vocabulary.
Consider the familiar concept of "duty." Did one of the drivers
proceed in such a way as to create risk for others? If the question
receives a positive answer, it is likely that that party will be found
liable for injuries caused thereby. The discussion will proceed in the
juridical language of duty, risk, and causation. With this language,
the trier of fact will devolve to a conclusion on the question of
liability and a judgment will issue.
An entirely different description of the event is also possible.
Imagine a physicist is asked "what happened?" She will answer that
objects proceeding through space and time met at a certain point in
mereological space and repelled one another. No mention of duty,
risk, or causation will be made. Why? Because these are not
concepts of physics. Physics and law are independent languages
(discourses) of description, each with their own distinct
vocabulary."3 4 It is these vocabularies that allow for distinctly
different answers to the question "what happened?"
A third answer is also possible. We could ask an economist "what
happened?" She might say "the cheapest cost avoider failed to take
suitable precautions." Other economic descriptions are possible, but
the point is that the language of economic description will be in a
vocabulary that is in no way coextensive with the discourses of law
or physics. And that is the point: in answer to the question "what
happened?," three plausible and logically distinct responses are
possible. None of the three modes of description is "the"correct
one.
1 5
The very idea of "the" correct one simply makes no sense. 3

132. A well-known approach to reductionism is Steven Weinberg's work. E.g., STEVEN
WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY 55 (1992) ("The reason we give the impression that

we think that elementary particle physics is more fundamental than other branches of
physics is because it is.").
133. This is why I maintain that Fish is not a pragmatist: he is a subjectivist. The focus
of the relativism is the individual-collective or isolated-not the practice.
134. These vocabularies are the appraisive tools of their disciplines. It is in the use of
these vocabularies that true and false assertions or statements are made.
135. This is the nub of the problem. Economists, philosophers, and theorists ofall stripes
write as ifsome nonlegal language can "rescue" law from itself. For an argument to the effect
that this is an illusory undertaking, see Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a
ConstructivistEpistemology ofLaw, 23 LAw & SOCY REv. 727 (1989).
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What, then,.of objectivity? The conclusion we inevitably reach is
that objectivity is relative to a domain. Within different fields,
practices, or discourses, one finds different forms of argumentdifferent ways of showing the truth of propositions.'3 6 The truth of
assertions within a domain cannot be proven nor disproven with the
forms of argument of other disciplines. There is no "form of forms"
or metaprinciple which can identify a given set of argumentative
forms as "the" correct ones, for the choice of forms is a matter of
history and utility.
The forms of argument in law could have been different 37 and
may yet become different. The forms of legal argument are an
inheritance, not a dictate. As I hope I have shown, this does not
make law any less "objective" than any other discipline. Law is
more argumentative than physics or arithmetic.' If law is less
objective than physics, the explanation lies more with us than the
world. In thinking about objectivity, it is a mistake to believe that
objectivity depends more on "the world" than on those who inhabit
the world. This, I have suggested, rests on a view of the relationship
of mind to world that no longer seems plausible.
136. I would go so far as to say that it is the various forms of argument that demarcate one
field or discipline from others. Why would we reject an opinion which, after recitation of the
facts of the case, provides three differential equations and the statement "Motion denied?"
The answer is that this decision-even if correct on the merits-expresses the judgment of
the court in a nonlegal discourse. One is reminded that, in law as in most things, how a
conclusion is reached is as important as what conclusion is reached.
137. BOBBIT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 67, at 5 ("The ways in which Americans
interpret the Constitution could have been different; indeed the forms of constitutional
discourse are very different in other societies.").
138. Dean Wellington spoke eloquently of this phenomenon in the context of the
disconnectetweenlegal academics andpractitioners. HarryWellington, Challengesto Legal
Education:The 'Two Cultures'Phenomenon, 37 J. LEGAL EDUc. 327, 327 (1987):
On the one hand, [the] methodology [of the academic] is apt to mirror the style
ofpolitical and moral philosophy, and accordingly, appear to the practitioner as
overly general and abstract, insufficiently particularistic and attentive to
institutional considerations....
[Another] factor is vocabulary: law teachers talk differently from practicing
lawyers. In the Sterling Law Buildings and elsewhere one hears heated
conversations about hermeneutics, externalities and deconstruction.
A reaction, extreme in the view of some, to the proliferation ofthese extra-legal orientations
maybe found in Judge Posner's recent rejection ofthe relevance of moral philosophy to law.
RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999). For a critique
of Posner's position, see Jeremy Waldron, Ego-BloatedHovel, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 597 (2000)

(book review).

